This study investigates into the issue of the cost and ways of resolving the circular share ownership system among the subsidiaries of Korean Chaebols. We examined and estimated the cost of each of the three ways of resolving it, i.e. firstly by cutting the weakest link of the chain of circular share holdings, secondly by building up vertically integrated ownership structure and finally by building up share holding company separating the banking and industry. From the point of feasibility of execution, this paper claims that the feasibility of the first way of cutting the weakest link method is low because of the acceptability by Chaebols and the third way of building up share holding is also set aside because of the possibility of breaking up the Chaebol system. However, this paper claims that the second way of building up vertically integrated ownership structure seems to be a possible alternative if Korean government uses progressive limitations on voting rights, grace periods for the transfer and exchange of holding shares and tax exemptions for dissolving the circular share holdings.