Insiders' incentive to raise offer price becomes straightforward when insiders plan to exit and the offering often accompanies secondary sales. On the other hand, insiders' secondary sales signals negatively and thus the offer price is discounted. Using Korean data, we examine which firm characteristics are relevant to insider selling. We find significantly positive relationship between inside ownership and insider selling and significantly negative relationship between existence of financial investor(FI) and insider selling. The results imply that insider selling is moderated for not sending negative signals so that FI can exit successfully. In Korean stock market, secondary sales are legislated in 2000's, KOSPI in 2003 and KOSDAQ in 2007 respectively. From the IPO case of Mando, we analyze how financial investors and affiliated firms profit and insiders benefit at the same time. After 2007, secondary sales becomes in vogue and among these cases, Mando's IPO case best explains the use of secondary sales satisfying both insider and FI's. Insiders successfully regain independent control and FI's pleasantly exit yielding notable return. Mando, once an affiliated firm of Halla business group until 1999, returned to Halla business group in 2008 and listed again in 2010. Mando sell both secondary shares and primary shares in the public offering. KDB PEF and H&Q PEF, financial investors joining to the consortium to take over Mando, yield 62% from secondary sales and earn 144% more by selling all their shares off after lockup expiration date. The ownership of FI's, about one third of total shares are dispersed to public investors and Halla business group maintain the position as the ultimate shareholder of Mando. Moreover Mando could finance for future investment from primary sales. KCC, the owner is kin to president of Halla business group, also yield 62% from secondary sales. Overall Mando's IPO case illustrates how listing decision is